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One of the urgent conceptual, normative and political tasks of our day is to think 
anew about how polities that aspire to be political democracies can accommodate great 
cultural diversity within one state. Given the reality of cultural diversity in many of the 
polities of the world, the belief that many people have that every state should be a nation 
and every nation should be a state seems to us to be misguided and indeed dangerous 
since, as we shall argue, many states in the world today in fact contain more than one 
nation (or territorially-based cultural groups) within their boundaries. 
The belief that every state should be a nation reflects perhaps the most widely 
accepted normative vision of a modern democratic state, i.e. the “nation state.”  After the 
French Revolution, especially in the 19
th century, many policies were devoted to creating 
a unitary nation state in France in which all French citizens had only one cultural and 
political identity. These policies included a package of incentives and disincentives to 
ensure that French increasingly became the only acceptable language in the state. 
Political mechanisms to allow the recognition and expression of regional cultural 
differences were so unacceptable to French nation state builders that advocacy of 
federalism was at times a capital offense. Throughout France, state schools at any given 
hour were famously teaching the same curriculum with identical syllabi by teachers who 




Numerous other state institutions, such as universal conscription, were designed to create 
a common French identity and to be robustly assimilative.
1 
Of course some very successful democracies, such as contemporary Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Japan, and Portugal are close to the ideal type of a unitary nation state. 
Some federal states such as Germany and Australia have also become nation states.  In 
our view, if a polity (at the historical moment when a conscious state directed political 
program of “nation-state” building begins) appears to be relatively culturally 
homogeneous throughout the territory of the state, and most of its citizens have a strong 
sense of shared history, the aspiration to create a nation state should not create problems 
for the achievement of an inclusive democracy.  In fact, the creation of such a national 
identity and relative homogeneity in the 19
th century was identified with democratization 
and was possible in consolidated states.  In the twentieth century, however, attempts to 
create a nation state by state policies encountered growing difficulties, even in an old 
state like Spain.  In our judgment, in the last century virtually no new nation-states have 
been created except as the result of wars, violence, oppression, and secession.  However, 
if a polity has great politically salient cultural and/or linguistic diversity (and many 
polities do) we will argue that political leaders in such a polity need to think about, 
normatively legitimate, and make use of, the concept of “state nation”.  
Linz and Stepan first introduced this concept in 1996, but only in a paragraph 
(and one figure).  “We…believe some conceptual, political, and normative attention 
                                                 
1 For a classic book on these policies see Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchman: The Modernization of 
Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). Most 19
th Century progressives and 
democrats, particularly those associated with the French Revolution, were profoundly opposed to 
federalism. For the normative advocacy of a unified, homogeneous, nation state see the entries on 
“Federalism, “Federation”, “Nation”, and “Departement” in the extremely illustrative but not well known, 
François Furet and Mora Ozouf, eds., A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Belnap 




should be given to the possibility of state nations. The states we would like to call state 
nations are multicultural, or even multinational states, which nonetheless still manage to 
engender strong identification and loyalty from their citizens, an identification and 
loyalty that proponents of homogeneous nation states perceive that only nation-states can 
engender.”  They went on to say that neither Switzerland nor India were [in the French 
sense] “strictly speaking a nation state, but we believe both can now be called state 
nations. Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India made significant gains in managing multinational 
tensions through skillful and consensual usage of numerous consociational practices. 
Through this process India became in the 1950s and the early 1960s a democratic state 
nation.”
2  
 The rest of this essay will be devoted to developing our concept of “state nation” 
and to applying it to polities such as Spain, Belgium, and India. We will attempt to 
demonstrate that all three of these polities have strong “state nation” (as well as some 
“nation state” and some “multinational”) identifications and loyalties. 
In order to develop the “state nation” concept, we think it necessary to clear some 
conceptual ground.  In thinking about how “socio-cultural diversities” are politically 
managed, there are two axes that need to be mapped, with the help of analytical 
distinctions.  The first axis pertains to the nature of socio-cultural diversities that present 
themselves to political actors.  Such diversities are of course a product of developments 
over a long historical period, but they are “givens” to political actors.  Hence the 
temptation to see these diversities as essential, natural, or primordial.  Nevertheless, what 
appear as essential divisions in any given society are no more than social cleavages that 
                                                 
2 See the chapter titled “Stateness, Nationalism, and Democratization,” in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 




happen to be politically activated and mobilized at that moment.  There is always a gap 
between the map of potential cleavages that underlie every society and the actual map of 
politically-salient divisions. 
All too often this axis is seen as ranging from “homogenous societies” to “diverse 
societies,” as if homogeneity or its absence were a “natural” condition or starting point.  
However, the division between so-called “homogenous” and so-called “diverse” societies 
is better captured as a distinction between societies in which socio-cultural divisions have 
not acquired political salience, on the one hand, and societies in which they have, on the 
other.  An historical context is built into this distinction; thus, the crucial question is 
whether such potential cleavages have become activated by the time competitive politics 
are instituted.  
 Furthermore, we need to distinguish among societies with different types of 
politically-activated socio-cultural divisions.  At one extreme are societies where social 
divisions have a geographical concentration and are articulated in more than one 
“nationalist” vocabulary throughout the territory of the state.  Such a society may be 
called a “multi-national society.”  
 At the other extreme are societies where socio-cultural divisions exist that are not 
geographically concentrated and are not articulated in a “nationalist” vocabulary.  
Following the recent literature, we would call such a society a “multi-cultural” society.  
 Between these two extremes are a range of societies, in which politically salient 
social divisions do permit varying degrees of geographical concentrations yet are not 




are between “ideal types.”  In reality, a society can be both “multinational” and 
“multicultural” at once.     
The second axis that invites theoretical clarification is the one we will be 
principally concerned with in this paper.  It relates not to the nature and articulation of 
socio-cultural diversities, but to the models of political strategies and some specific 
institutional responses for dealing with such diversities.  Three ideal-types can be 
delineated along this axis.   
“Nation-state” policies stand for a political-institutional approach that attempts to 
privilege one socio-cultural identity over other potential or actual socio-cultural cleavages 
that can be politically mobilized.  That has been achieved historically by following a 
variety of routes: (1) by creating or arousing a special kind of allegiance or common 
cultural identity in those living in a state; (2) by encouraging the voluntary assimilation of 
those who do not share that initial allegiance or cultural identity into the nation-state’s 
identity; (3) by various forms of social pressure and coercion to achieve this and to 
prevent or destroy alternative cultural identities; and (4) by coercion that might, in the 
extreme, even involve ethnic cleansing.   
By contrast, “state nation” policies stand for a political-institutional approach that 
respects the legitimate public and even political expression of active socio-cultural 
cleavages, and that evolves mechanisms to accommodate competing or conflicting claims 
made on behalf of those divisions without privileging or imposing any one claim.  “State 
nation” policies involve creating a sense of belonging (or “we-feeling”) with respect to 
the state-wide political community, while simultaneously creating institutional safeguards 




feeling” may take the form of defining a tradition, history and shared culture in an 
inclusive manner, with attachment to common symbols of the state and/or inculcating 
some form of “constitutional patriotism.”   
In democratic societies, the institutional safeguards constitutive of “state nation” 
policies most likely take the form of federalism, and often specifically asymmetrical 
federalism, and/or consociational practices.  
Why is federalism an institutional response that is frequently central to the design 
of a state nation?  This is the subject of Stepan’s larger work in progress.
3 But, for the 
proper understanding of the argument we develop in this paper, we should note that 
Stepan demonstrates that virtually every long-standing and relatively peaceful 
contemporary democracy in the world whose polity has more than one territorially 
concentrated, politically-mobilized, linguistic-cultural majority, is not only federal, but 
“asymmetrically federal”( Spain, Belgium, Canada, and India).
4 This means that these 
polities, in order to “hold together” their great diversity in one democratic system, have 
special cultural and historical prerogatives constitutionally embedded for some of the 
member units, prerogatives that respond to their somewhat different linguistic/cultural 
aspirations, demands, and/or historical identities.
5  We believe that had political leaders 
insisted upon attempting to impose one language and culture on the country and insisted 
upon a homogenizing French –style unitary nation state, the cause of social peace,  
                                                 
3 See his “Federalism, Multinational States, and Democracy: A Theoretical Framework, The Indian Model 
and a Tamil Case Study”. 
4 Some border line cases might be Sri Lanka, but while it may be a marginal democracy, it certainly is not 
peaceful. The United Kingdom is multinational but English is the strong majority language  in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland and thus in this sense the UK does not have more than one territorially 
concentrated linguistic majority as does Belgium, Spain, Canada, or India. Nonetheless, the multi-cultural 
and multinational United Kingdom is increasingly becoming asymmetrical with elected assemblies recently 
created for Scotland and Wales as well as for Northern Ireland. 
5 The concepts of “asymmetrical federalism” and “holding together federalism” will be developed with 




inclusionary democracy, and individual rights would not have been served in any of these 
four, long-standing democratic states. This was so because more than one territorially 
based, linguistic, cultural majority had already been activated in each of these four 
countries. The strategic question therefore was whether to attempt to repress or 
accommodate this preexisting diversity.  Asymmetrical federalism historically emerged 
in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and India as a policy response aimed at accommodation. We 
therefore think that, as a normative concept, an institutional framework, and a set of 
historical experiences, “asymmetrical federalism” should be strongly considered, by 
theoreticians and political leaders alike, as a possible approach to democracy in polities 
such as Sri Lanka and Burma that have more than one territorially based, already 
politically activated, linguistic-cultural majority within the existing state.  
In sum, then, the idea of the nation associated with the “nation state” approach 
implies creating one common culture within the state; while the idea of the nation 
associated with the “state nation” approach can contain more than one politically-salient 
culture, but nonetheless encourages and requires respect for the common institutions of 
the state, as well as respecting existing socio-cultural diversities.
6 
Thus, “state nation” is a term introduced to distinguish democratic states that do 
not, and can not, fit well into the classic French style “nation state” model based on a “we 
feeling” resulting from an existing or forged homogeneity. “State nations” nonetheless 
can, and have, managed to create powerful and positive citizens’ identification with the 
                                                 
6 The analytical distinction between “nation-state” and “state-nation,” as the terms imply, involves an 
affinity – since both include the term “nation,” and certainly, for some theorists of nationalism, both terms 





institutions and symbols of the state, such as the Constitution, inclusive democratic 
institutions and procedures, and guarantees of basic freedoms. 
The state nation needs to be differentiated from another model -- namely, that of  
“pure” or extreme multinationalism, in which territorially-concentrated, socio-cultural 
groups that employ a “nationalist” vocabulary and conceive of their “nationalities” as 
nation-states in potentia, aim at reducing the state to a basic minimum, with the result, 
intended or not, of an extremely weak (if any) “we-feeling”.    
  Unlike the concepts of the “nation state” or the “state nation”, pure or extreme 
multinationalism is more a sociological concept than a particular type of political 
institutionalization.  Pure or extreme multinational societies cannot be nation-states (in 
the specific French sense of the term), but  they can be either state-nations or the basis for 
conceptualizations aiming at a confederal (but not a true federal) state. Relatively stable 
democratic federal states are either nation-states or state-nations, but not mere aggregates 
of multiple nation-states (i.e. confederations of multiple nation-states).  When the “we 
feeling” is dominantly or only centered on a “nation”, and the state is identified with only 
one of the “nations” within the state (or is perceived as alien, or worse as an oppressor to 
the other “nations”), the construction of a state-nation becomes difficult, if not 
impossible.  Democracies are stable in multinational societies only if an effort is made to 
legitimate the state by those who also could aim at its disintegration. 
  It is clear to us that if citizens in a territorial region of a state define their primary 
loyalty as being exclusively to that region, and if they have almost no loyalty or 
identification with the central state, not only that federal system, but that state as well, is 




The leaders of “nationalities” – or “nations” – in a multinational state may reject being 
part of a “state-nation”; they may define themselves as “nations” living under a state (not 
as “part of” or “in” a state), and commit themselves to a nation-building project against 
the state, with the goal of achieving statehood at the first opportunity (by peaceful or 
violent means).  This does not exclude the possibility that, after attaining statehood, the 
new nation-state may establish friendly relations with the state from which it separated, 
even possibly a confederal relation.  Obviously, many advocates of such a “pure” (or 
what we consider extreme) multinational state do not express themselves so bluntly.  
Some of them demand that the whole state becomes multinational “all-the-way-down”, 
doing away with as many symbols and practices supporting the idea of a common state.  
They may advocate a state that is a sum of nations, each with its own exclusive identity, 
symbols and laws, where the state becomes an empty shell, and the citizens of the state 
have nothing important to say about common institutions – except to the extent that in 
international relations and organizations, the states and their citizens have a say.  
Let us now turn to examine the relationship between the two axes, one 
representing activated socio-cultural diversities, and the other representing institutional 
responses and political strategies.  As we have suggested, a key question here is the 
relation between state nations and multinational societies (such as Yugoslavia in the late 
1980s) in which all the nationalities are conceived of as nation states in potentia, and 
whose leaders aim at reducing the common state to a basic minimum. The result of this 
process can be the generation of a very weak “we feeling” among the citizens of the state. 
In the case of Yugoslavia, by the early 1990s, most citizens of the state felt they were 




also “Yugoslavian”. Dual and complementary political identities and loyalties had 
virtually disappeared as “multinational” Yugoslavia had increasingly become merely a 
composite of hostile, aspirant nation states with very little or no “we feeling”.  
Multinational societies (even those which tolerate and indeed manifest dual identities and 
much “we feeling”, like Spain) cannot be complete nation states in the classic French 
sense of the term.  However, and this is crucial, multinational and multi-cultural societies 
can be, or can become, state nations with strong we feelings, if complementary as well as 
multiple cultural and political identities exist or are generated. 
Another issue concerns the relation between multicultural societies and the two 
competing conceptions of the “nation state” and the “state nation”.  Our conception of 
“state nation” derives from our belief, based on historical case studies and analysis, that 
democracy is possible in polities that are sociologically and politically multi-cultural and 
even partly (but not exclusively) multinational, if an effort is made to legitimate the state 
by those minorities and majorities who could conceivably aim at its de-legitimation.  Our 
advocacy of the term “state nation” is also based on our recognition that in some 
countries, cultural groups are not territorially concentrated but instead are so diffusely 
located that even “asymmetrical federalism” is not an option. However, given the 
robustness of these different politically salient cultural groups, a classic French-style 
“nation state” may also not be an option for a peaceful democracy without a costly, and 
most likely non-democratic, period of state imposed assimilation efforts, and possibly 
even ethnic cleansing.  Nonetheless, in the same cultural context, a state nation may be a 




Some readers might feel that the term “state nation” is an “ideological” concept. 
However, the argument in France about the absolute necessity of creating a “nation state” 
after the French Revolution was also ideological. In any case, “ideological constructs” are 
both a reflection, and a source, of empirical political-social realities. Our introduction of 
the term “state nation” is intended both to introduce a normative standard to which 
democracies in polities that appear highly diverse can aspire to, and to introduce a set of 
at least three observable empirical socio-political realities that a polity, if it is a state 
nation, will manifest.  
A diverse polity, if it has become a state nation, will have the three following, 
empirically demonstrable patterns. First, despite multiple cultural identities among the 
citizens of the polity there will be at the same time a high degree of positive identification 
with the state, and pride in being citizens of that state. Second, there will be a high degree 
of trust in the most important constitutional, legal, and administrative components of the 
state. Third, by world democratic standards, there will be a comparatively high degree of 
positive support, among all the diverse groups of citizens in the country, for the specific 
state-wide democratic institutions through which the multicultural and possibly 
multinational polity is governed. 
At this point, we need to address a potentially powerful, but in our view, 
misguided, argument about socio-cultural diversity.  After the bloody disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and parts of the Soviet Union, many analysts have begun to reject wholesale 
all political and institutional frameworks that grant any form of prerogatives to 
territorially-concentrated, socio-cultural groups -- arrangements which they refer to as 




believe they privilege “sub-national” socio-cultural identities at the expense of 
identification with common symbols, institutions and individual rights.  This privileging, 
they claim, is likely to foster at least the activation of conflictual, as opposed to 
complementary, identities, and perhaps violence and fragmentation.
7   
These critics ignore, however, the fact that nearly all successful democratic states 
with more than one politically-activated, territorially-concentrated, linguistic-cultural 
majority, have institutional frameworks that include a substantial (but absolutely not, as 
in Yugoslavia, a virtually exclusive) “ethno-federal” dimension. In successful state 
nations, group rights do not, and should not ever, violate the individual’s rights that come 
to them as individual members of the state. Witness the institutional frameworks of the 
states that we consider to be exemplary state-nations – namely, Belgium, Canada, Spain, 
and India.  The institutional frameworks of all of these contain an element of “ethno-
federalism.”  Nevertheless, none of these states can be classified as purely “ethno-
federal” either, since in these states recognition of the legitimate public and political 
expression of active socio-cultural “national” cleavages is balanced with constitutionally 
sanctioned respect for common symbols,  institutions, and individual rights, thus 
facilitating the maintenance and nurturing of multiple and complementary, as opposed to 
single and conflictual, identities.   
We believe that it would be a grave error to discard the state-nation approach 
simply because the institutional framework associated with it tends to contain a 
                                                 
7 Even though in her book, Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Valerie Bunce does not explicitly argue this point, many 
people who read  her book, have employed its analysis of the Yugoslavian and Soviet experiences to make 
the case that “ethno-federal” institutions by themselves are “subversive” institutions for stateness and peace 
.  See also Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: 




significant ethno-federal dimension.  In our judgment, in order for a variety of states 
(such as Burma or Sri Lanka) that are not now peaceful or democratic to achieve a 
consolidated democracy, they would have to strive to become state-nations.  This means, 
quite simply, that for consolidated democracy to be possible, these states would have to 
craft institutional frameworks that contain both (a) a substantial “ethno-federal 
dimension” and (b) mechanisms facilitating identification with common symbols and 
institutions.  If, in the process of democratization, leaders of these states were to pursue 
either a pure nation-state model, or a pure ethno-federal model, the result would almost 
certainly be continued armed struggle and failure to achieve democratic consolidation.   
Let us not allow a reading of the Yugoslavian and Soviet experiences to destroy 
the legitimacy of all institutional arrangements containing a “ethno-federal” dimension; 
for to do so would require giving up on the middle ground of the “state-nation” – a model 
that has proven valuable in the important but extremely difficult task of reconciling 
cultural inclusiveness with democratic stability in states containing more than one 
politically-activated, territorially-concentrated, socio-cultural “national” group (see 
Figure #1). 
         Figure 1 goes here 
 
Let us now attempt to develop the argument in more detail to see if, and how, 
culturally diverse countries such as Spain, Belgium and India approximate our analytic 






 “Holding Together Federalism” and “Asymmetrical Federalism” as Frequent 
Institutional Forms for the Model of  State-Nations 
 
  The fact that a number of the oldest and most successful states were nation-states 
led many to think that all states should be coterminous with nations, that states should be 
nation-builders like France was in the nineteenth century, and that all nations should 
become states, as the Wilsonian ideology of self-determination implies. 
  However, a large number of states do not fit into the classical conception of the 
nation-state and are in fact multi-national societies.  One example is Spain, one of the 
oldest states in Europe whose borders have not changed since the mid-seventeenth 
century. Linz, writing in 1970 before the transition to a federal type of state after the 
death of Franco, asserted that Spain is a state for all Spanish citizens, a nation-state for a 
large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities.  
Also, he added, there is a small minority which contests or rejects that state and seeks 
independence.
8 
    In the Spanish case, like that of quite a few other countries, would-be nation-
builders who sought to create a unique shared sense of identity based on language, 
history and culture following the French model, ultimately failed.  We would argue that 
such efforts in the twentieth century were often not fully successful; in the twenty-first 
century, they might well backfire and arouse the latent sense of national identity of 
significant minorities.
9  In 1993, in a paper titled “State Building and Nation Building,” 
                                                 
8 Juan J. Linz, “Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State: the Case of 
Spain,” in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Building States and Nations: Analyses by Region. 
Volume II (Beverly Hills, Ca: Sage Publications, 1973) 32-116. 
9 In India the phrase “minority” normally refers only to a “religious minority”. However, in this paper we 
will follow standard social science vocabulary when we use the word “minority” so to include linguistic, 




Linz formulated clearly some of the main reasons why we feel this is the case.  He 
stressed in particular how in today’s world, sensibilities have emerged within the 
“international community” that act as an effective pressure against it.  He wrote:  
“We are living in an era in which the liberal democratic principles of legitimacy, the 
institutions of the Rechtsstaat, are being loudly proclaimed by everyone, even when they 
might be constantly violated.  That legitimacy formula makes it impossible in many 
countries needing the respect of the world community to pursue oppressive and 
discriminatory policies against those asserting primordial identities, cultural and 
linguistic rights, and also the articulation of nationalist sentiments, even of extreme 
nationalists.  This is a reality that modern states cannot ignore except by turning to 
authoritarianism, a choice that often is also not legitimate for those who do not share 
sympathy with, or tolerance for, the nationalists questioning the idea of nation-state 
building by the state.  In this context, it is necessary to turn to different and new methods 
of state integration other than those based on nation building.”
10 
   
In addition, and complementary to Linz’s point about the international zeitgeist, 
Alfred Stepan, too,  has stressed interconnected technological and normative 
developments that have led to a certain “de-territorialization” of conceptions of 
individual identity, and thus rendered the chances of successfully pursuing classical 
models of nation-state building decreasingly likely in contexts where a significant 
percentage of the permanent residents are first or second generation immigrants (or 
originally guest workers) and have different cultures.  In an article titled “Modern 
Multinational Democracies: Transcending a Gellnerian Oxymoron,” first published in 
1998, he argued:  
“Given the significant technological changes that have occurred since the 
late nineteenth century state-induced homogenization processes so well 
described by Eugene Weber, and the analytically distinct but related 
emergence of what Charles Taylor calls ‘the politics of recognition,’ there 
are grounds for thinking such processes are now less available.  Most of 
the world’s minorities can keep in cultural contact with their home 
cultures via radio, cassettes, and cheap air travel to a vastly greater extent 
than was possible a hundred years ago.  Also, due to advances in literacy 
and communications, more minority communities have semiprofessional 
‘cultural carriers’, in the Weberian sense of Träger, than a hundred years 
                                                 




ago.  Normative changes in the form of increased desire for cultural 
autonomy in some minority (especially Muslim) communities – contested 
by rising antiforeign sentiments in the majority cultures that reduces the 
integrating capacity that in theory the majority culture would like – 
probably have contributed to greater cultural will, and greater cultural 
capacity, for minorities to resist cultural assimilation.”
11  
  
Given all of these developments, we think it necessary to issue a warning to 
would-be nation-state builders in contexts with a significant degree of politically salient 
cultural and linguistic diversity: specifically, that their strategy is likely to be ineffectual 
at best; and most likely it will end up being radically counter-productive.  Put simply, the 
pursuit of nation state building policies will probably provoke the very kind of 
fragmentation that adherents of the nation-state model most deeply fear.  In the process, it 
will frequently engender significant levels of resistance – resistance that can often only 
be countered effectively by descent into authoritarian styles of rule.  As such, it seems 
clear that in many parts of the contemporary world, nobody with a genuine commitment 
to democratic governance should support the pursuit of the nation-state model in contexts 
where there are already politically salient issues that revolve around deep, especially 
territorially-based, cultural differences.  
  Any minority today has articulated leadership and structures, and has intellectuals 
which formulate their national aspirations and finds support among those concerned with 
their rights as a culture.  This makes the assimilating policies of the successful 
nineteenth-century nation-builders, as in France, aiming at erasing such distinct identities, 
extremely costly.   
  In our view, as we shall show with the limited data we have, India at one point or 
another has been and is, like Spain, Belgium and Canada, to mention three democratic 
                                                 




federal states with multi-national components, a nation-state for most citizens, a state to 
which they owe allegiance but not a nation in the classical sense for significant 
minorities, and the state that is contested by some minorities in the periphery of the 
state.
12 
  This brings us to a basic distinction among federal states between those 
federations which are largely “coming together” in their origin, versus those that are 
largely “holding together“ in their origin.
13  Coming together federations were basically 
formed by a process in which relatively autonomous separate units, often sharing much of 
the same political culture, sometimes a common enemy, jointly arrive at an agreement to 
pool part of their previous sovereignty in order to gain the advantages of creating a new 
federal state. This has been the case of the United States when the thirteen colonies got 
together to achieve a more perfect union as an independent state.  The history of Australia 
fits that same pattern, as does even multicultural Switzerland. 
  But there is another quite different process for the emergence of new federal 
states.  Old states, governed as unitary states and originally conceived as future nation-
states, when confronted with rising peripheral nationalisms, with new identities based on 
language, culture or history which threaten their unity, can turn to federalism to continue 
to “hold together” the people in a common state.  This has been the origin of the long 
process of the transition in Belgium since independence in the 1830's from what was 
                                                 
12 For a typology of democratic states that takes into account both whether they are unitary or federal ones 
and whether they are mono-national or multi-national, see Juan Linz, “Para un mapa conceptual de las 
democracias,” Politeia, no. 26 (2001): 25-46. 
13 Our original formulation of the distinction between “coming together” federalism and “holding together” 
federalism can be found in Alfred Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, 
(Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Stepan, Arguing Comparative 




supposed to be a unitary nation-state to a new federal state. A similar process occurred in 
Spain in the 1970s.  This might be the future of Sri Lanka. 
  There are great differences between the federations formed by a “coming 
together” of separate units, like the Swiss cantons in the course of their history, the 
United States and Australia, where the pre-federal units retained considerable power and 
sometimes a sense of identity, and are zealous of their rights with respect to the center, 
and those ”holding together” federations created on the basis of an existing state, 
particularly a unitary state, which devolves power to units to satisfy their emerging 
demands.
14   
  The “coming together” process of federation formation tend to create 
constitutionally symmetrical federations, whereas federations that are“holding- together” 
in their origins and intentions tend to have important, constitutionally embedded, 
asymmetrical characteristics.   
  Obviously, some countries do not fit neatly into this typology.  Occasionally the 
reality involves elements of both processes.
15  This was the case in Canada where, in 
1867, asymmetrical federalism was used to “hold together” French-speaking Quebec and 
English-speaking Canada; but Canadian federalism also served to incorporate the 
                                                 
14 It is possible that if the princely states in India had coincided with cultural, linguistic and other social 
characteristics, and the federation had been created as was sometimes discussed in the thirties by the 
princely states retaining their identities, acceding to a federation, India could have been a case of a “coming 
together” federation. For many reasons we shall not discuss here, this did not happen. For the atmosphere 
of the debate in the 1930’s see N.D. Varadachariar, Indian States in the Federation (Calcutta: Oxford 
University Press, 1936). 
15 In the case of the Soviet Union, especially in 1919 to 1923, there was actually a third pattern that Stepan 
calls “putting together” federalism. See his “Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective”, Post-Soviet 




Maritime Provinces that, after important incentives were arranged, wanted to “come 
together” and join the new federation.
16  
  In the case of India, the joining of Sikkim, facilitated by Article 2 of the 
constitution, which allows for the possibility of other political units to join the republic, 
reflected some “coming together” elements, as did the social reality of the Indian 
independence movement itself.  German federalism in the nineteenth century served the 
processes of nation-building, giving the nation the roof of the common state, although 
formally it was the coming together of kingdoms, dukedoms and city states under 
Prussian hegemony. 
  Some federal states are based on a strong national identity in practically all its 
citizens. They are relatively homogeneous in their culture, language and sense of history 
and can be seen as nation-states.  The state and the nation are one.  Germany, after giving 
up claims to Alsace-Lorraine and losing the eastern territories inhabited by large numbers 
of Poles, is now a nation-state with tiny minorities enjoying a special status like the 
Danes on the northern border and the Sorbs.  However, with the Cold War division 
between the Bundesrepublik and German Democratic Republic, there were two states and 
one nation. The two states each sought to legitimize their rule, in West Germany by what 
was called the Verfassungspatriotismus, the loyalty to the democratic liberal state and its 
market institutions, and in East Germany by the construction of a socialist state.
17   
                                                 
16 For an overview of the current constitutional impasse in Canada, see Richard Simeon, “Canada: 
Federalism, Language and Regional Conflict” in Nancy Bermeo, ed, Territorial Conflict and Federalism in 
Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). On the evolution of 
Quebecois nationalism, see Maurice Pinard, “Les  quatre phases du mouvement indépedantiste québécois,” 
in Robert Bernier, Vincent Lemieux, and Maurice Pinard, eds., Combat Inachevé (Sainte-Foy, Quebec: 
Presses de l’Université du Quebec, 1997). 
17 For the original formulation of the concept of “constitutional patriotism,” see Dolf Sternberger, 
Verfassungspatriotismus (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1990). For Jurgen Habermas’s development of 




  The first Austrian republic was founded in 1918 and in its constitution defined 
itself as part of the German nation and was committed to joining the German Federal 
Republic.  Only after the second World War did Austria acquire an identity of its own as 
a state, though not for a long time as a nation.
18 
    Most of those writing about Switzerland do not see it as a nation-state, but as a 
voluntary state that we would characterize as a “state-nation”. With its linguistic 
heterogeneity of largely mono-lingual German, French and Italian  (Raeto-romansch-
speaking) cantons, Switzerland is a unique federation. Given the fact that none of its 
linguistic regions, none of its religious communities, and none of its cantons consider 
themselves nations, as many Basques and Catalans consider their Autonomous 
Communities in Spain, it would be wrong to consider Switzerland a multinational state.  
The Swiss confederation enjoys a legitimacy, felt by all its multicultural and largely 
cantonal-focused citizens, which is unique, and provides the ideal type of what we call a 
state-nation, where the institutions of the state with its distinctive political culture is the 
basis of a particular type of identification of its citizens.
 19 
                                                                                                                                                 
Suhrkamp, 1996).  For a recent elaboration on the theme (in English) and adaptation of it to contexts 
outside of Germany, see Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” in Between Facts and Norms 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), 491-515. 
18 On the very recent emergence of national consciousness in Austria, see T. Bluhm, Building an Austrian 
Nation. The Political Integration of a Western State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).  See 
especially 220-241.  On the same theme, see also the excellent piece by Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram, 
“Politisch-Kulturell Wandel in Österreich,” in Plasser and Ulram, eds., Staatsbürger oder Untertanen? 
Politische Kultur Deutschlands, Österreichs und Schweiz im Vergleich (New York: P. Lang, 1991) 157-
245.    
19 A fine overview of the Swiss case can be found in Lidija Basta, “Minority and Legitimacy of a Federal 
State,” in L. Basta and Thomas Fleiner, ed. Federalism and Multiethnic States. The Case of Switzerland 
(Fribourg, Switzerland: The Institute of Federalism, 1996) 41-69.  For another treatment that deals 
extensively with language policy in Switzerland, see Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in 
Multilingual Societies, vol.1 (Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1986).  For an earlier 
formulation of the concept of the state-nation, and its distinctiveness from both the nation-state and the 
multi-national state, see Juan Linz, “Democratic States, Nation-States, State-Nations and Multinational 
States,” unpublished.  A shortened version of this article was published in German as “Nationalstaaten, 
Staatsnationen und multinationale Staaten,” in Marcus Gräser, Christian Lammert and Söhnke Schreyer, 




  In contrast to the ideal-typical state-nation of  Switzerland, in state-nations with 
important multinational components, such as Spain, Belgium, or Canada, many citizens, 
who may constitute a significant proportion of the population of federal units, identify 
with a distinctive nation with its own language, culture, history, rights and grievances 
against the state in which they live.  The federal state-nation is a nightmare to those who 
originally conceived of the state as a nation-state; a nightmare to those who want to 
nationalize the whole population in the process of nation-building, of which the French 
Republic would be the historically most successful model; a nightmare for those nation 
builders for whom federalism would be conceived, at the most, as a form of 
decentralization for purposes of administrative efficiency. 
 
Multinational Societies: Multiple and Complementary Identities? Possible State - 
Nations?: Spain and Belgium  
  There are those who think that the multi-national federal state is inevitably 
condemned to break-up, who see federalism in those states as only a step toward 
disintegration, and who therefore want to limit the federal constitution and engage in a 
process of more or less aggressive nation-building.  For complex reasons into which we 
cannot enter here, such efforts are likely to fail, producing a backlash that will lead to the 
opposite result from the one that their proponents pursue.  However, intelligent political 
engineering, constructive political leadership and some favorable contextual factors can 
serve to overcome the tension inherent in multi-national societies.  A federal state that is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hans-Jürgen Puhle (Göttigen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2001), 27-38.  See also Juan Linz, 
“Democracia, multinacionalismo y federalismo,” in Revista Española de Ciencia Política, Volume 1 




multinational can become a successful state-nation.  Unfortunately, we have few 
systematic studies of how this has been achieved. 
  A study of the Indian Republic and its history and institutions could make an 
important contribution to this important task for social scientists and policy-makers. As 
can closer study of Spain and Belgium.  Unfortunately, some of the brilliant theorizing 
about multi-culturalism, particularly in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in 
Europe, in recent years, is only in part relevant to this task.
20  Multi-culturalism in the 
way that we find it discussed in that literature is not distinctive to federal states.  The 
literature is equally relevant to unitary states like France, with its increasingly important 
Muslim immigrant population. The literature on multicuturalism is especially relevant to 
cultural minorities, particularly immigrants claiming a range of rights as individuals and 
communities, but who are not the same as territorially based autochthonous communities 
with an articulated or latent national identity.   
  Multi-culturalism represents a different dimension of social and political reality 
that we can find in nation-states, state-nations, and multi-national societies. Also 
multiculturalism certainly can be found in India as a whole and within the states of the 
Indian federation.    
                                                 
20 The literature on “multiculturalism” is of course extensive, and here we will only refer the reader to some 
of the most basic works, written from a variety of perspectives.  These include: Brian Barry, Culture and 
Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Seyla Benhabib, 
The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002); Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989), as well as his more recent contribution, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995); Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity 
and Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in 
Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); James Tully, 
Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 




  Most of the literature on nationalism treats national identities as if they were 
mutually exclusive.  The literature is plagued with the use of expressions like “the 
Catalans,” or “the Flemish,” and their opposites, “the Spanish,” or “the Belgians.”   
However, such expressions represent a gross over-simplification.  Though nationalists on 
both sides reject the idea of dual identities as a form of bigamy, in fact, in all more or less 
multi-national societies, most citizens tend to have dual, and often complementary, or at 
least not exclusive, identities. 
  The region of Catalonia, in Spain, provides a case in point.  Since the late 
nineteenth century and particularly in the twentieth century, there has been a growing 
sense of cultural and, increasingly, national identities among people in bilingual regions 
in certain parts of Spain – most acutely, in Catalonia and the Basque Country.
21  At the 
turn of the century, nationalist parties emerged in both of these regions and began to 
articulate these identities.  In the decades following the Spanish Civil War, such identities 
gained additional strength as a reaction to the Franco regime, since that regime pursued 
an aggressive policy against peripheral nationalist movements, including discriminatory 
language policies.  By the end of the Franco era, the democratic opposition had come to 
sympathize with the peripheral nationalist movements and to demand that their 
aspirations be at least partly recognized.   In the transition to democracy, the drafters of 
the 1978 Constitution did just that; they agreed to accommodate linguistic, cultural, and 
                                                 
21 For a useful bibliography on the historiographical debates about the rise of peripheral 
nationalisms in Spain, see Xosé-M. Núñez, “Historical Research on Regionalism and 
Peripheral Nationalism in Spain: a Reappraisal,” published as a working paper by the 
European University Institute in Florence as ECS no. 92/6 (1992).  For Linz’s 
contribution to this debate, see Juan Linz, “Early State-Building and Late Peripheral 
Nationalisms against the State: the Case of Spain,” in S. N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, 




national differences by organizing the state as an “Estado de autonomías,” a type of 
federal political system.
22   
  Since the transition to democracy in Spain, a number of questions about national 
identity have been asked in opinion polls – all of which reveal the predominance of 
multiple and complementary identities.  Exclusive and competing identities turn out to be 
the exception, not the rule.  For example, when asked, “Which of the following sentences 
would you identify with most: I feel only Spanish, I feel more Spanish than 
Basque/Catalan/etc., I feel as Spanish as Basque/Catalan/etc., I feel more 
Basque/Catalan/etc. than Spanish, or I feel only Basque/Catalan/etc.,” only 16% of the 
Spanish population chooses an exclusive Spanish identity, and another 5% chooses an 
exclusive Basque/Catalan/etc. identity.  Dual identifications are dominant, sometimes 
more Spanish, sometimes more Catalan, or whatever other region is chosen.  Specifically, 
11% of the Spanish population choose “more Spanish than Basque/Catalan/etc.,” 50% 
choose “as Spanish as Basque/Catalan/etc.,” and 16% choose “more Basque/Catalan/etc. 
than Spanish.”
23   
                                                 
22 On the process of devolution to a federal state in Spain, see Juan Linz, “Spanish Democracy and the 
Estado de las Autonomías,” in Robert A. Goldwin, Art Kaufman, and William A. Schambra, eds., Forging 
Unity Out of Diversity (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989), 
260-303. On electoral results in and public opinion about the Estado de las Autonomías during the first 
decade-and-a-half of democracy, see Juan Linz, “De la crisis de un estado unitario al Estado de las 
Autonomías,” in Fernando Fernández Rodríguez, ed., La España de las Autonomías (Madrid: Instituto de 
Estudios de Administración Local, 1985), 527-672.  On the continuing conflict in the Basque Country, see 
Juan Linz, Conflicto en Euskadi (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1986).  Also see Francisco J. Llera, Los Vascos y 
la Política. El proceso político vasco: elecciones, partidos, opinión pública y legitimación en el País 
Vasco, 1977-1992 (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco, 1994).  On public opinion in the 
Basque Country, see Euskalherria en la encuesta Europea de valores (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 
1992). Also see the series of Euskobarometro, directed by Francisco Llera, (Bilbao: Servicio Editorial 
Universidad del País Vasco).  For public opinion in Catalonia, see the yearly surveys published by the 
Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), and Francisco 
Andrés Orizo and Maria-Àngels Roque, Cataluña 2001: Los catalanes en la encuesta Europea de valores 
(Madrid: La Fundación Santa María, 2001). 
23 All the data we cite from Spain is based on the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Study no. 2228 




  What’s more, despite the fact that identification with the region is significantly 
stronger in Catalonia than it is for the Spanish population as a whole, still only a small 
minority of the population registers an exclusive identity.  To be exact, in Catalonia a 
mere 11% of the population identify themselves as exclusively Catalan, while another 
12.9% identify themselves as exclusively Spanish.  The rest – approximately three-
quarters of the population there – report some kind of dual identification.  They feel as 
Catalan as Spanish (36%), or more Spanish than Catalan (12%), or more Catalan than 
Spanish (26%); but they do not exclude one or the other identity.  The same can be said 
for the Basque Country, the region in which identification with the Spanish nation is 
weakest: even there, those who identify themselves as exclusively Basque barely reach 
one-fifth of the population (see Table #2). 
 
Table #2: Subjective National Identity in Spain. 
Subjective National Identity in Spain 
  All of Spain  Basque 
Country 
Catalonia Galicia 
Only Spanish  16  05.4  12.9  04.9 
More Spanish than 
Cat/Basque/Gal 
11 04.0  11.4  07.8 
As Spanish as Cat/Basque/Gal  50  36.2  36.7  43.9 
More Cat/Basque/Gal than 
Spanish 
16 29.9  25.7  35.5 
Only Cat/Basque/Gal  05  20.6  11.0  06.9 
Don't Know/Don't Answer  02  04.0  02.2  01.0 
  100 100 100 100 
(N) (4932)  (428)  (744)  (490) 
 
Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Study #2228, March 1996. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 






  Nor is Spain an exception in this regard; for the same is true in the case of 
Belgium.  Belgium was founded in 1830 as an independent unitary parliamentary 
monarchy.  In the course of a complex process marked by considerable conflict, it has 
evolved in the twentieth century into a federal, basically bi-national and bilingual federal 
democracy.
24   
  In Belgium, a number of relevant questions about national identity have been 
asked in opinion polls too, distinguishing between those who speak Dutch, those who 
speak French, and the inhabitants of Brussels.  All of these again reveal the predominance 
of multiple and complementary identities.  For example, when asked, “Which of the 
following statements applies most to you: I consider myself only as a Belgian, I feel more 
Belgian than Fleming or Walloon, I feel as Belgian as Fleming or Walloon, I feel more 
Flemish or Walloon than Belgian, or I feel only Flemish or Walloon?,” only 2.9% of the 
Belgian population choose an exclusive Flemish or Walloon identity.  Thus, despite all 
the talk about the polarization of identities in Belgium, only a tiny fraction of Belgian 
citizens reject outright any kind of affective identification with the state.  Though another 
14.2% choose an exclusive Belgian identity, the overwhelming majority choose a dual 
identity of one kind or another – in descending order, “as Belgian as Flemish or Walloon” 
(43.2%); then “more Belgian than Flemish or Walloon” (20.5%); and finally “more 
Flemish or Walloon than Belgian” (17.4%).
25 
                                                 
24 For a good synthesis of this historical process and an extended discussion of language policy there, see 
chapter one of Kenneth D. McRae’s Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium (Ontario, 
Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986).  For a study that focuses on linguistic conflict in the 
metropolitan region of Brussels, the only place where significant numbers of French-speakers and Flemish-
speakers live side by side, see Jan de Volder, “Le FN Brade Bruxelles,” in Revue Française de 
Geopolitique, no. 6 (May 1998). 
25 The data we use for Belgium is based on the 1995 General Election Study, conducted by the 
Interuniversitair Politieke-Opinieonderzoek, K.U. Leuven, and the Point d’appui Interuniversitaire sur 




  Among the French-speaking Walloons, who at the time of the founding of the 
state lived in the more prosperous and state-building communities, identification with the 
Belgian nation is somewhat stronger than it is for the whole of the population. 17.7% of 
them identify themselves as only Belgian; 24.8% identify themselves as more Belgian 
than Walloon; and 43.8% identify themselves as much Walloon as Belgian.  A mere 
9.8% identify themselves as more Walloon than Belgian; and a miniscule 1.8% feel only 
Walloon.  In the capital city of Brussels, the only place in the country where significant 
numbers of French-speakers and Dutch-speakers live side by side, 23.5% identify 
themselves as only Belgian; 25.7% identify themselves as more Belgian than Flemish or 
Walloon; 31% report an equal dual identity; 11.3% identify themselves as more Walloon 
or Flemish than Belgian; and only 2.6% fail to mention the Belgian identity.  But despite 
the fact that identification with the region is stronger in Flanders than for the population 
as a whole, perhaps what is most surprising about the Belgian case is the strength of the 
Belgian identity among the Flemish people.  In Flanders, those who identify themselves 
as exclusively Flemish amount to a mere 3.5% of the population.  Over 95% of “the 
Flemish” identify to some degree with the Belgian state – 10.6% identify themselves as 
only Belgian; 17.0% identify themselves as more Belgian than Flemish; 44.6% identify 
themselves as equally Belgian and Flemish; and 22.8% identify themselves as more 












Table #3: Subjective National Identity in Belgium. 
 
Subjective National Identity in Belgium 
  All of 
Belgium 
Flanders Wallonia Brussels 
Only Belgian  14.2  10.6  17.7  23.5 
More Belgian than 
Flemish/Walloon 
20.5 17.0 24.8  26.7 
As Belgian as 
Flemish/Walloon 
43.2 44.6 43.8  31.5 
More Flemish/Walloon than 
Belgian 
17.4 22.8 09.8  11.3 
Only Flemish/Walloon  02.9  03.5  01.8  02.6 
Don't Know/Don't Answer  01.9  01.4  02.2  04.5 
 100  100  100  100 
(N) (3651)  (2099)  (1258)  (311) 
 
Source: 1995 General Election Study Belgium. 
 
  What’s more, not only do the overwhelming majority of citizens in Belgium, 
regardless of the territory from which they hail, identify themselves at least sometimes as 
Belgians; but also, they register a very high degree of affective attachment to an 
important common state institution – specifically, the monarchy.  Such attachment is 
evident in the responses of Belgian citizens to a question about how much they trust their 
king – for fully 54.3% of them claim to trust him either very much or a lot (13.4% and 
40.9%, respectively); while a mere 10.6% of them claim to trust him only a little or a 
very little (5.9% and 4.7%, respectively).  Now, it needs to be noted that among 
Walloons, the level of trust in the king is moderately higher than it is among the Flemish.  
Whereas 59.2% of the former claim to trust their king at least a lot, only 50.6% of the 
latter do so.  Nevertheless, despite this difference, the fact remains that both communities 
share a very strong sense of attachment to the king, and by extension to the institution of 






Table #5: Trust in the king. 
  Trust in the King 










Don't Know / 
Don't Answer
N 
All of Belgium  13.4 40.9 32.5 5.9 4.7  2.6  (3668) 
Flanders 10.7  39.8  35.0  7.4  4.2 2.9  (2099) 
Wallonia 16.4  42.8  29.7  3.4  5.2  2.4  (1258) 
Brussels 19.3  40.5  27.0  5.8  6.1 1.3  (311) 
 
We understand this kind of affective attachment to a set of common institutions and 
symbols to be indispensable for the legitimacy, and therefore stability, of any state in 
contexts with a high level of cultural, linguistic and even national heterogeneity.  This is 
why we stress the importance of not only multiple but also complementary identities 
within a multi-national, federal, democratic framework.  Of course, as we have already 
suggested, there are two intimately related difficulties with this framework: first, that 
centralists often dream of doing away with the fact of multiple identities; and second, that 
peripheral nationalists often seek to undermine the fact of complementary identities.  But, 
at least in the Belgian case, neither of these difficulties seem to be unmanageable.  We do 
not share the skepticism of some other commentators, who feel that Belgium is falling 
apart.  Both the overwhelming preponderance of dual identities and, especially, the high 
level of affective attachment to common symbols and institutions there justify our sense 
of optimism.  Were such affective attachment to common symbols and institutions 
lacking, there would be reason for pessimism.  Late in Yugoslavia, for example, it is 
highly doubtful that any Yugoslavian institution had a high level of trust by all the 
citizens of the country.  Fortunately, however, the Belgian case is quite different from 




  By all means, nationalists would like the question formulated not as, “Are you 
more Flemish than Belgian?” or “Are you more Catalan than Spanish?” but rather as, 
“Are you either Flemish or Belgian?” or “Are you either Catalan or Spanish?” – despite 
the ubiquity of multiple and complementary identities in settings that are more or less 
multi-nation.  And inevitably, both those who speak of self-determination, that is, the 
right of every nation to become an independent state, and those who favor a total national 
integration into a single cultural or linguistic community, reject the very idea of dual 
identities. 
  This is the main reason (and there are many) why democratic plebiscites are 
normally such an undesirable solution.  People have to make one or another choice, like 
the one of defining the territorial units for which the decision should be binding.  The 
quorum necessary to reverse such a decision is totally different from a normal election 
since it cannot be reversed four years hence. A plebiscite might be the only solution in 
certain extreme situations where the polarization created by violent conflict has destroyed 
any dual identity.  But in those cases it will mean a loss of rights and equal citizenship 
among those not supporting the majoritarian choice.  
 
Reflections on India as a “State Nation”: Accomplishments and Threats 
As comparativists, and as observers who have had the opportunity to visit many 
parts of India, we are very aware of India’s continuing problems with low levels of 
literacy, nutrition, basic sanitation, as well as periodic communal riots.  Some of these 




of some relatively new dangers to the quality of democracy in India, which we will 
discuss later.  
Table #6: Comparative Indicators of India’s Human and Income Poverty. 
 
Average GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in 2000 (US Dollars) among Arend Lijphart’s 
universe of the thirty-six continuous democracies of the world from at least 1977 to 1996  $20,252 
India’s GDP per Capita in PPP in 2000 (US Dollars)    $2,358 
India’s Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking among the 173 countries of the world ranked by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  124/173 
India’s HDI Ranking among Arend Lijphart’s thirty-six continuous democracies   34/36 
India’s Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) among the 88 developing countries ranked by the UNDP  55/88 
Adult Female Literacy Rate in India  45.4% 
Percentage of Underweight Children in India at age 5  47.0% 
 
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 149-152, 157-159, 172, 190-193, and 224. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms 
and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999). See table 4.1 for Lijphart’s universe 
of the thirty-six countries in the world that were all continuous democracies in his judgment from at least 1977 to 1996. 
 
However, the focus of this essay is on political institutions and perceptions of 
them as mechanisms for handling societal diversity and potential conflict.  As writers 
about democracy and democratization in the world, and as students of nationalism, multi-
nationalism, and diversity and extreme crises of “stateness, such as in the former USSR 
and Yugoslavia, we are convinced that India has more diversity than any long standing 
democracy in the world and that democracy nonetheless is increasingly supported by the 
overwhelming majority of these diverse groups in India. This pattern is not sufficiently 
recognized, not to say analyzed, by general readers or even by most specialist scholars, so 
we will now attempt to document, and begin to account for, these phenomena.   
Notwithstanding the great linguistic, religious, ethnic, and caste differences within 
its diverse polity, India is one of the world’s democracies that scores most highly on the 




Our methodological and analytic position is that in politics, what has been 
socially constructed, can also be socially destroyed. We shall discuss these possibilities 
later in this conclusion. However, no matter what may happen in the future, India’s past 
and present achievements concerning being a state-nation are worthy of reiteration, and 
comparative analysis, in this conclusion. 
Concerning identification, certainly less than 30% of the total Indian population 
speak Hindi, are Hindus, and come from a part of India (ie., the non-“inner line” areas) 
that experienced the somewhat homogenizing and interactive impacts of direct British 
Colonial rule, and more importantly, the historic Gandhi-Nehru led Congress Party 
independence movement.  
Nonetheless, in answer to the World Values survey question “ How proud are you 
to be Indian,” 69.6% of all Indian respondents said they had a “ great deal” of pride, and 
18.1% answered they were “quite” proud. Thus, 87.7% of Indian respondents were proud 
of being Indian. Among the 11 long-standing federal democracies in the world only the 
United States and Australia had higher “great deal” of pride scores. Moreover, among the 
four long-standing federal democracies that have a significant multinational dimension 
(Canada, Belgium, Spain and India) India has the highest percentage of respondents who 











Table #7: “How proud are you to be (nationality)?”  Responses in the 11 longstanding 
federal democracies (percent). 
 
How proud are you to be (nationality) 
  Great Deal  Quite  Not Very  Not at all Don't 
know 
Total 
USA 77.3  19.8  01.5  00.3  01.0  100 
Australia 70.3  23.0  02.1  00.4  00.1  100 
India 69.6  18.1  07.1  01.2  04.0  100 
Brazil 64.1  19.1  14.3  01.9  00.3  100 
Spain 63.8  26.2  04.5  03.1  00.5  100 
Canada 60.6  33.8  04.0  01.5  00.0  100 
Argentina 55.3  28.9  08.3  02.6  04.8  100 
Austria 53.0  39.9  05.7  01.4  00.0  100 
Belgium 29.0  52.3  12.5  06.1  00.0  100 
Swiss 23.5  46.7  15.9  07.2  06.7  100 
Germany 11.1  35.8  21.5  13.7  17.9  100 
 
Source: The data for all countries but Austria, Belgium and Canada is from World Values Study: 1995-1997, Ronald Inglehart et al., 
Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, question 205.  The data for Germany is from 
the Lander of the former West Germany.  Canada, Belgium and Austria were not included in the 1995-97 survey.  The data for them is 
from WVS: 1990-93. 
 
Concerning trust in major state institutions, Pippa Norris of Harvard, using the 
World Values study of 1990-1992, came to the conclusion that among the twenty-one 
countries she analyzed for trust in five key political and state institutions (the  parliament, 
civil service, legal system, police, and  army) India ranked first, and the three other 
multinational countries ranked 8
th (Canada), 17
th (Spain) and 19
th (Belgium). Pippa 
Norris’ set of countries included such long standing and leading social welfare states as 












Table #8: Institutions and Political Trust in India and Twenty Other Democracies: 































































Source: Pippa Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), figure 11.2, p. 229. Norris constructed this chart by combining 
the responses in World Values Surveys: 1990-93 concerning trust for five institutions, parliament, 
the civil service, the legal system, the police, and the army, p.222. 
 
Our confidence in Pippa Norris’ findings was bolstered when we ran the data on 
trust in six major institutions for the eleven long-standing federal democracies using the 
1995-1997 World Values study. When we combined “great deal of trust” and “quite a lot 
of trust” for each of the six institutions, India ranks first or second out of the eleven 




ranks first or second for more than two institutions. When we study the scores for the 
three other multinational countries we see that Belgium and Canada rank in the top two 
for only one institution (of the four for which we have data) and Spain was not in the top 





Table #9: Responses in the 11 Longstanding Federal Democracies to Questions about Citizen Trust in Six Major Institutions (percentage) 




Switzerland India  Brazil  Canada  USA  Spain  Argentina Australia  Germany  Belgium Austria 
Great Deal  5.1 11.5 10.9 5.9 4.7 3.8 5.1 2.3 1.1 n.a.  n.a. 




















Not Very  34.3   22.4  19.3   50.2  55.2   44.3  41.7   53.7  53.2  n.a.  n.a. 
None  11.7   12.3  31.6   12.1  14.2   22.7  31.6   19.9  21.1  n.a.  n.a. 
Don't Know  3.7   17.0  0.9   0.0  0.0   3.0  0.0   0.0  2.2  n.a.  n.a. 
 




India Belgium  Switzerland Austria  Canada Spain  Brazil  Australia USA Germany  Argentina 
Great  Deal  11.5 3.6 2.2 6.0 5.8 3.6 4.8 4.0 3.1 1.4 2.1
Quite 41.9  }53.4 39.1}42.7 39.2}41.4 35.2}41.2 32.2}38.0 31.1}34.7 28.5 }33.3 26.6}30.6 27.2}30.3 26.7}28.1 13.9}16.0
Not Very  18.9    43.4   40.1  48.9   51.4   40.9  20.3     54.0  55.4   55.7   43.6  
None 9.4    13.8   12.9  9.9   10.7   19.2  45.3     15.4  14.2   11.9   40.4  
Don't Know  18.4    0.0   5.5  0.0   0.0   5.1  1.1     0.0  0.0   4.3   0.0  
 




India Switzerland  Austria  Brazil  Canada Germany  Spain  Belgium  USA  Australia  Argentina 
Great  Deal  19.0 9.2 14.9 17.4 10.4 7.6 7.6 6.6 6.1 5.2 6.8
Quite 47.8  }66.8 55.3}64.5 43.5}58.4 37.3}54.7 44.0}54.4 46.1}53.7 37.0 }44.6 38.0}44.6 30.2}36.3 29.8}35.0 19.9}26.7
Not Very  14.4    27.3   34.7  21.1   38.8   39.5   39.9     40.3  50.1   53.4   47.6  
None 4.1    5.9   6.8  23.8   6.8   5.4   11.1     15.1  13.6   11.6   25.7  










Table #9 cont. 




Canada Australia  USA  Germany Austria  Switzerland Spain  Belgium  Brazil  India  Argentina 
Great Deal  24.3  18.1 16.3 10.0 16.5 11.7 11.0  6.9 9.4 11.7 3.9























Not Very  13.1     20.5   23.7   26.1   27.5  25.3   27.1     37.6  20.2   28.7  46.4  
None 2.8     3.9   5.1   2.8   4.7  5.2   9.8     11.4  34.1   22.5  31.0  
Don't Know  0.0     0.0   0.0   0.8   0.0  2.9   2.6     0.0  0.8   13.0  0.0  
 




India Brazil  Switzerland USA Spain  Australia  Germany  Argentina Canada  Belgium  Austria 
Great  Deal  11.0  3.7 1.2 2.7 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.2  n.a. n.a. n.a. 

















n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Not Very  28.2    19.4     48.6     62.4    49.1     66.1    66.0     42.1     n.a. n.a. n.a. 
None  16.2   47.6     19.1     16.3   29.0     18.0   17.5     49.5      n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Don't Know  16.2    0.8     6.9     0    4.0     0.0    3.0     0.0     n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 




Brazil India  USA  Canada  Germany  Switzerland Belgium  Austria  Spain  Australia  Argentina 
Great Deal  13.9 12.7  7.2 6.2 2.5 2.0 4.3 5.6 3.5 3.6 0.7
Quite 44.7}58.6 40.5 }53.2 44.7}51.9 43.9}50.1 44.1}46.6 40.9}42.9 38.3}42.6 36.3}41.9 36.1}39.6 34.6}38.2 7.1 }7.8
Not Very  21.8  17.1     40.4  42.6   43.2  39.4   42.9   50.6  41.8   51.2   43.9  
None 18.7  6.1     7.8  7.3   7.6  11.4   14.5   7.5  13.5   10.6   48.3  
Don't Know  0.8  23.6     0.0  0.0   2.8  6.3   0.0   0.0  5.0   0.0   0.0  
_______________________________ 
Source: The data for all countries but Austria, Belgium and Canada is from World Values Survey: 1995-97, Ronald Inglehart et al., 
Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan. The data for Germany is from the Lander of 




from World Values Survey: 1990-93. For both the 1990 - 1993 and 1995 - 1997 surveys the question numbers were from top to 





Concerning our indicator of support for democracy, as Table 10 shows, 60% of 
respondents in India said that “democracy is preferable to any other form of 
government”. In 2001(a particularly bad year) the Latin American average for this 
question was 48%. Chile only had 45% and Brazil 30%. In East Asia, Korea, in 1999, 
only had 53%.
26 
Table #10: Attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism in six post-1975 cases of 
redemocratization: Uruguay, Spain, India, Korea, Brazil and Chile (in percentages).  The 
number in parenthesis shows the attitude of those who answered the question. 
 
Attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism in six post-1975 cases of redemocratization 
Country 
Questions  Uruguay Spain India  Korea  Chile  Brazil
With which of the following phrases are you most in agreement?   
Democracy is preferable to any other form 
of government 
80 (85)  78 (83)  60 (83)  53 
(48) 
52 (54) 41 
(48) 
In some circumstances an authoritarian 
government can be preferable to a 
democratic government. 
08 09  06    18  21 
For someone like me, a democratic or a 
nondemocratic regime makes no 
difference 
06 07  06    25  23 
Don't know/ No answer  06  06  27    04  15 
N (1213)    (8133)    (1200) (1240)
 
Source: The data for India are from the National Election Study, 1998, coordinated by Yogendra Yadav of the Center for the Study of 
Developing Societies, Delhi.  Data for Uruguay, Brazil and Chile are from the Latino Barometer 1996, directed by Marta Lagos.  The 
Spanish data are from the Eurobarometer 37 (1992).  The Korean data is from the Korea Democracy Barometer 1999. In Brazil, for 
the 2002 Latino Barometer the "Democracy is preferable to any other form of government" response has dropped from 41% in 1996 to 
37%. 
 
However, in a diverse polity, even if the average is fairly high, if within a major 
minority group, support for democracy is low, this can present a problem. Yet this is not 
a problem in India concerning religion because the major religious minority group is the 
Muslims, and they are not statistically different in their support of democracy (59.2%) 
than the Hindus (60.1%). See Table 11.  
                                                 
26 For Latin America in 2001 see Marta Lagos,  “A Road With No Return?”, Journal of Democracy,14 ( 





Table #11: Opinions about democracy by religious groups. 
Opinions about democracy by religious groups 
Hindu Muslim Christia
n 
Sikh Others Total 
Democracy is preferable  60.1  59.2  61.8  66.4  69.7  60.3 
Sometimes authoritarianism is 
preferable 
05.7 05.5 08.1 05.5 03.9 05.8 
No  difference  06.1 08.0 11.2 01.6 05.3 06.4 
Don't know/ Can't say  28.0  27.3  18.9  26.6  21.1  27.5 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N)  (6749) (895) (285) (128) (76) (8133) 
 
Source: Indian National Election Study 1998. 
 
Of the major long-standing democracies in the world India has by far the lowest per 
capita income. If the poorest segment of the population had a very low support for 
democracy in contrast to the rest of the population this could also present a problem, but 
54.9% of the “very poor” in the Indian sample answered that “democracy is preferable”. 
Finally, given India’s uniquely important caste system, it is important to note that even 
among the Scheduled Castes (formerly called “untouchables”), 56.6% support 
democracy. In comparative terms therefore, the percentage of India’s Muslims, of India’s 
untouchables, and of India’s poorest strata, who answer that “ democracy is preferable to 
any other form of government”, is about ten percentage points higher (for each of these 
potentially alienated anti-democratic groups) than the average of Latin America countries 
for 2001. 
On our three key empirical indicators for which a high score is particularly useful 
for a diverse polity to be a successful “state nation”, positive identification and pride in 




scores extremely well. In this respect, India’s past and present achievements in creating 
unity, democracy, and a useable state in the context of great diversity must be recognized, 
and we hope, further analyzed. 
We would like to end our discussion of India however with a major cautionary 
note. There is a significant element of “social construction” in politics. What has been 
socially constructed can under some circumstances be socially destroyed. More than a 
quarter of a century ago Linz and Stepan edited a volume on the breakdown of 
democracy in twelve countries. One of their major conclusions was that “the independent 
contributions made to the breakdowns  by political incumbents is a theme that emerges in 
almost all cases.”
27  Linz and Stepan also concluded that virtually none of the 
breakdowns was inevitable. 
The authors of this essay have two major conclusions concerning India’s political 
engagement with its socio-cultural diversity.  First, India is not a classic “nation state.”  
Second, India has managed to create a functioning, democratic “state nation.”  In our 
judgment, the effort to attempt to forge a classic “nation state” of the French style would 
destroy the present, functioning “state nation” and not assure the creation of a democratic 
nation-state.  It would be extremely dangerous and ultimately unsuccessful and would 
almost certainly produce at best, a lower quality democracy, an eroded state nation, and 
weaker attachments to the state. To the extent that the Indian state is not a classic nation-
state, and that India’s federalism has historically recognized the diversity of people 
within the union, a nation-building campaign on the basis of a cultural, linguistic or 
religious homogeneity, and the marginalization of those not sharing in this sought after 
                                                 
27 See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes ( Baltimore and 




homogeneity, is a potential threat to the Indian state.  Many loyal segments of the 
population in India, many groups, many political administrative units, can be part of a 
state-nation, but not part of a classical nation-state. 
However, increasingly in India, some militant groups often referred to as “Hindu 
fundamentalists” (such as the RSS, the VHP, and the Bajrang Dal, and frequently – but 
not always – supported by the BJP) often use a discourse, and carry out actions, whose 
socio-political consequences, if their project for India were ever implemented, would 
make India sharply less inclusive.  In the Gujarat massacres of 2002, in which 
approximately 1500 Muslims were killed, many of these groups supported, indeed helped 
coordinate, the anti-Muslim attacks, with the complicity of the BJP’s state government.  
In the wake of the massacre, the BJP swept elections in Gujarat, and discussion of the 
“Gujarat model” as the future electoral strategy of the BJP was frequently referred to in 
Indian political discussions.  After the Gujarat elections, Ashutosh Varshney wrote the 
following, which we will quote at length to give an indication of the worries that some 
important observers have about the current threats to pluralism and inclusiveness in India.  
“  In effect, Gujarat’s electorate has legitimised independent India’s first 
unambiguous pogrom, a pogrom much more vicious than the the killings of the 
Sikhs in Delhi in 1984, a pogrom that came closest to the classic, anti-Jewish 
pogroms of Russia and Europe in the late 19
th and the first half of the 20
th century. 
The Congress Party, though deplorably involved in anti-Sikh violence in 1984, 
never had an anti-Sikh ideology. For purely electoral reasons, the Congress 
became contingently anti-Sikh for a while. In contrast, the VHP, the RSS and 
their stormtroopers, the Bajrang Dal, have an anti-Muslim ideological core. 
Therefore, the victory of Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress in 1985 was basically a strategic 
phenomenon, cynically parasitic as the Congress campaign was on Mrs Gandhi’s assassination by 
her Sikh bodyguards. The BJP’s victory in Gujarat , on the contrary, is ideological. It is about a 
larger vision of the polity, in which minorities, as the RSS put it earlier this year, must seek 
protection in the goodwill of the majority community, not in the laws of the land. The massive 
legitimisation of an ideologically charged pogrom is a truly bruising embarrassment for all Indian 
liberals and a severe undermining of the pluralist national vision in Gujarat.”
28 
                                                 






Clearly, if the Gujarat model became a dominant model in India this would bring 
about the socio-political destruction of India’s state nation. We hope that this will not 
occur, and we do not believe it is inevitable that it will.
29  Much of what we have 
discussed about India’s institutions as well as the data we have presented here about the 
attitudes of citizens would support a more optimistic view.  
                                                 
29 Let us briefly mention some reasons that make us more confident than many others that the “Gujarat 
model” is not bound to be successful in India’s twenty-seven other states. Gujarat has many features that 
make it exceptional in India. First, the Gujarat electoral model was aided by the fact that the BJP was ruling 
in Gujarat without the actual , or at least potential, constraint of coalitional partners. In all other major 
states where the BJP was then in power they were in multi-party coalitions. Second, Ashutosh Varshney in 
his award winning book Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, ( New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), p.97, presents data on deaths as a result of communal violence per 1,000,000 of 
urban populations in seventeen major states in India from 1950-1995.  Gujarat, by far, had the highest death 
rate. Third, of the seventeen states for which we have survey data on support for democracy, the state that 
had the highest number of explicitly anti-democratic responses in 1998 was Gujarat (see Table 18).  Fourth, 
Gujarat had emerged as the safest electoral bastion for the BJP and had witnessed the most intense Hindu-
fundamentalist mobilization of any state in the decade prior to the massacre.  See Yogendra Yadav, “The 
patterns and Lessons [of Gujarat Election Verdict]” (Front Line, January 3, 2003: 10-16).  Fifth, the Godra 
incident in which 58 Hindus burned to death in a train returning from Ayodhya, one of the main symbols 
for Hindu fundamentalism, helped ignite the massacres. Without great complicity by incumbents, and 
unprecedented terrorism by civil society groups (whether Muslim or Hindu), a Godra type incident will be 
an extremely rare occurrence. More generally, we can say that the leaders of the BJP as a political party 
(who are in a governing coalition with twenty-three partners) for reasons of parliamentary, coalitional, 
electoral, and even very important national and international investment imperatives, might well want to 
distance themselves from full association or complicity with, the projects of such groups as the RSS, VHP 
and the Bajrang Dal.  Finally, a non-BJP government at the center, might not allow this, not only out of a 
commitment to value India’s tradition of inclusiveness but also for reasons of party competition.  This 
would contribute to governability, a strong Indian state, and wide-spread support for a state nation. Such a 
government at the center, in all likely-hood, would not tolerate an individual state leader’s incitement of a 
Gujarat type anti- inclusionary campaign and its attendant massacres.  The BJP’s defeat in the state 















































































































































































































       Low                                                            High 
       Intensity of Political Activation of Multiple, Territorially-Concentrated, Socio-Cultural “National” Identities 
 
Figure One: Democratically-Probable and Improbable Relationships between Activated, Territorially-Concentrated, Socio-Cultural 
Identities and Political-Institutional Strategies. 
 
 
A Democratic State Is 
Possible: 
 
If only one significant, territorially 
concentrated, politically activated socio-
cultural identity exists, democratic nation-state 
crafting is possible. State structures can be 
unitary or symmetrically federal.  Eg. France 
and Japan in the 19




A Democratic State Is 
Possible: 
 
If significant dual and complementary 
identities exist, democratic state-nation 
crafting is possible, but a nation-state would be 
extremely difficult.  Least conflictual state 
structure would be asymmetrical federalism, in 
which some cultural prerogatives are 
constitutionally embedded for sub-units with 
salient, territorial identities. Eg. Belgium, 
Spain, Canada, and India. 
 
A Democratic State Is 
Improbable: 
If almost no loyalty to central state authorities 
and common symbols exist, and most citizens 
in sub-units of the state primarily identify with  
“national” aspirations in these units, and see 
these units as nation-states in potentia,  
citizens’ political identities are singular and 
conflictual. Crafting a democratic, federal, 
multi-national state is extremely improbable, 
due to inter-acting conflicts between 
secessionist attempts and possible   
centralization efforts.  The situation could lead 
the central government, even if it is 
democratically elected, to turn to methods of 
repression incompatible with individual human 
rights Eg Yugoslavia in the late-80’s